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INTRODUCTION
Emboldened by their victory in Heller,1 gun rights advocates are
waging a relentless campaign to strike down what little remains of the
nation’s relatively anemic gun control regime.2 The Heller opinion
itself is also partly responsible for generating a seemingly limitless

* Paul and Diane Guenther Chair in American History, Fordham University. I
would like to thank the editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal and my colleague
Professor Nicholas Johnson for organizing this conference. I would also like to thank
Al Brophy, Joe Blocher, Patrick Charles, Chuck Dyke, and Larry Rosenthal for
helpful discussions that contributed to my thinking about the issues developed in this
essay. Mark Frassetto and Ryan Keating provided invaluable research assistance.
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. On modern gun rights gun culture, see JOAN BURBICK, GUN SHOW NATION:
GUN CULTURE AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006); ABIGAIL A. KOHN, SHOOTERS:
MYTHS AND REALITIES OF AMERICAN GUN CULTURES (2005); ROBERT J. SPITZER,
THE POLITICS OF GUN GONTROL (4th ed. 2008); ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE
BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA (2011).
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parade of new lawsuits.3 Legal scholars from across the ideological
spectrum have attacked the controversial five-to-four decision, both
for its revisionist rewriting of constitutional history and for its poor
judicial craftsmanship.4 The opinion raised more questions than it
answered and left lower courts scrambling to decipher what was
prohibited by Heller, if anything, short of a total ban on handguns.5
The decision articulated no theory of judicial scrutiny, provided no
black letter rules, and failed to create any categories of analysis to
guide judges. Instead, it left the courts with an incomplete laundry
list of presumptively lawful regulations to serve as a model of what
remained legal.6 In United States v. Masciandaro, Judge J. Harvie
Wilkinson aptly summarized the problems that Heller’s poor judicial
craftsmanship wrought: “This case underscores the dilemma faced by
lower courts in the post-Heller world: how far to push Heller beyond
its undisputed core holding.”7
The first section of this Article examines the continuing relevance
of history in the post-Heller era. The second section focuses on
conceptions of the right to bear arms and the right to carry in the
Founding era. Apart from service in militia, there is little evidence of
a broad constitutional consensus on a right to carry arms in public.
The third section analyzes some of the myths and realities about early
American gun regulation. The fourth section locates the legal ideal of
traveling armed in public in a distinctively southern tradition that was
a minority strain within Antebellum law. The final section of this
Article explores the alternative theory of robust arms regulation that
emerged by the era of the Fourteenth Amendment and became the
dominant tradition in American law. The existence of this regulatory
3. Post Heller Litigation Summary, LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
http://smartgunlaws.org/category/second-amendment/ (last updated Nov. 7, 2012).
4. For a lucid critique of Heller from the right, see J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of
Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009). For
an equally trenchant critique from the political Left, see Reva B. Siegel, Dead or
Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191
(2008).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2012) (purchasing
firearms in another state); United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2011)
(possession of firearm by domestic violence misdemeanants); United States v.
Booker, 644 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (domestic violence misdemeanants); United
States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011) (undocumented immigrants);
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (possession of firearm with
obliterated serial number); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010)
(felons).
6. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
7. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011).
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tradition has remained hidden from modern scholars and courts
because support for high levels of gun regulation was so pervasive
outside of the South that few of these laws were ever challenged in
court.
I. HISTORY AND THE FUTURE OF GUN REGULATION: HELLER’S
LEGACY
Rather than close the book on historical argument, Heller appears
to have done the opposite. The court stated this point succinctly in
United States v. Masciandaro: “[H]istorical meaning enjoys a
privileged interpretative role in the Second Amendment context.”8
Unfortunately, judges are in the unenviable position of evaluating the
complex and contradictory historical evidence paraded before them.
Separating historical myths from historical realities, distinguishing
historical fact from error, and disentangling law office history from
rigorous historical scholarship are serious problems for the courts in
this area of the law.9
One of the most controversial issues to arise in the wake of Heller
is the right to carry firearms outside of the home. This issue is

8. Id. at 470. Courts are not just divided over how to weigh particular types of
historical evidence, but there is some disagreement over which period of history is
relevant to the various types of Second Amendment claims being made. Should the
courts focus on Founding era materials, post-enactment sources, or evidence from the
era of the Fourteenth Amendment? Justice Scalia employed late nineteenth century
sources to interpret Founding era approaches to preambles, an approach that only
underscores Heller’s intellectual incoherence. For additional discussion of Heller’s
many temporal oddities, see Siegel, supra note 4, and Saul Cornell, Originalism on
Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST.
L.J. 625, 639 (2008). For a more charitable reading of Heller that attempts to bring
some order to this question, see Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third
Battle over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703 (2012).
9. On the problems of Second Amendment “law office history” and historical
myths clouding Second Amendment discussions, see infra note 112 and
accompanying text. Rostron offers some thoughtful comments on the inherent
difficulty of using history to resolve modern issues such as the scope of Second
Amendment protections for those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors:
Exploring how American society viewed domestic violence in the Founding
era might be a fascinating topic for a doctoral dissertation, but it would
undoubtedly be a challenging undertaking for judges, and ultimately a
pointless one because the historical record on an issue of such complexity
undoubtedly contains much to support many different views. Judges simply
will be disappointed if they hope to find specific and clear historical
evidence about the Founding generation’s attitude toward the rights of
domestic abusers.
Rostron, supra note 8, at 751–52 (citations omitted).
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currently being litigated in the Fourth Circuit and a decision may well
be rendered by the time this Article is published.10 Masciandaro
reveals the problems that Heller has created. In Masciandaro, the
defendant was arrested for possessing a loaded firearm in a national
park.11 The court applied an intermediate scrutiny test and found that
the statute in question, which prohibited loaded firearms in national
parks, easily passed constitutional muster.12 The government’s
interest was important and the means chosen to effectuate this goal
were substantially related to that interest.13 Although the three-judge
panel agreed on this point, there was substantial disagreement over
the scope of Heller’s holding regarding the right to bear arms outside
of the home.14 In Masciandaro, the majority refused to wade into this
question. Judge Wilkinson and Judge Duffy embraced a minimalist
reading of Heller, counseling judicial restraint, particularly on this
crucial question:
There may or may not be a Second Amendment right in some places
beyond the home, but we have no idea what those places are, what
the criteria for selecting them should be, what sliding scales of
scrutiny might apply to them, or any one of a number of other
questions. It is not clear in what places public authorities may ban
firearms altogether without shouldering the burdens of litigation.15

Judges Wilkinson and Duffy took no position on this issue, but
their argument implicitly suggested that one could make a plausible
case that Heller’s holding established no right to carry firearms
outside the home. Judge Niemeyer, by contrast, argued that Heller
did assert the existence of a right beyond the home:
Consistent with the historical understanding of the right to keep and
bear arms outside the home, the Heller Court’s description of its
actual holding also implies that a broader right exists. The Court
stated that its holding applies to the home, where the need “for
defense of self, family, and property is most acute,” suggesting that

10. The notion that Heller ought to be read to include a right to carry outside of
the home has been most fully developed in two cases decided in the Fourth Circuit.
See United States v. Weaver, No. 2:09-cr-00222, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29613 (S.D.
W. Va. Mar. 7, 2012); Woollard v. Sheridan, No. L-10-2068, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28498 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2012). An appeal in the latter case was being briefed at the
time that this Article went to press.
11. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 459.
12. Id. at 473.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 469.
15. Id. at 475 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
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some form of the right applies where that need is not “most acute.”
Further, when the Court acknowledged that the Second
Amendment right was not unlimited, it listed as examples of
regulations that were presumptively lawful, those “laws forbidding
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings.” If the Second Amendment right were
confined to self-defense in the home, the Court would not have
needed to express a reservation for “sensitive places” outside of the
home.16

The logic of Judge Niemeyer’s argument seems especially weak
when read against the actual beliefs and practices that the American
legal tradition demonstrates. The assertion that the need for selfdefense is most acute in the home implies nothing about the existence
of a right to self-defense outside the home. Even under Heller’s
flawed version of history, one plausibly could argue that the Founders
decided to constitutionalize the right only in the home. Self-defense
beyond the home implicates far broader questions of public safety. It
makes historical sense that the Founding generation decided to leave
the resolutions of these difficult questions to the more flexible
standards afforded by the common law and the public policy
preferences of individual legislatures. The fact that the Founding
generation needed weapons to train and hunt also has little bearing
on how these weapons might have been used outside of the home
because pistols were not typically part of the standard weaponry of
the militia. Finally, the fact that some states and localities chose to
ban carrying in sensitive places while others chose to enact broad
bans only underscores that gun regulation in American history
reflects the diversity of the American historical experience.17
II. THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN THE FOUNDING
ERA
Virginia was the first state to draft a new Constitution and
Declaration of Rights. George Mason, the primary architect of the
Virginia Declaration of Rights, was a leading patriot and took a major

16. Id. at 468 (internal citations omitted). See the discussion infra Part IV for
specific examples of different types of arms regulation.
17. For a discussion of pistol ownership in the founding era, see infra note 81 and
accompanying text. On the militia’s standard armaments, muskets and rifles, see
discussion infra notes 66–93 and accompanying text. On regulation, see infra notes
66–83 and accompanying text.
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role in the creation of the new state’s militia.18 An early advocate for
colonial independence, he became an outspoken champion of the
militia. Mason urged his fellow citizens to enact a law to put the
colony’s militia in a state of readiness for possible war with Britain.
Mason’s vision of the militia invoked traditional Whig ideas.19 On
January 17, 1775, Mason prepared this set of resolutions for the
Fairfax County Committee of Safety, an important institution
responsible for coordinating Virginia’s military efforts:
Resolved, That this Committee do concur in opinion with the
Provincial Committee of the Province of Maryland, that a well
regulated Militia, composed of gentlemen freeholders, and other
freemen, is the natural strength and only stable security of a free
Government.20

Mason’s emphasis on the need for the militia to be composed of
property holders reflected a view common among members of
Virginia’s gentry elite that it was dangerous to arm the “rabble.”21
Without the guidance of gentlemen, an armed population might easily
become a mob rather than a well-regulated militia. The radicalism of
the revolution pushed Mason and other Virginians to embrace a more
inclusive conception of the militia.22 The language that Virginia
eventually adopted asserted that the militia was “composed of the
body of the people,” a formulation that reflected the more
democratic ethos associated with Revolutionary ideology. When the
committee charged with producing a declaration of rights revised
Mason’s original draft, they settled on the following language:

18. SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND
THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 18–20 (2006) [hereinafter CORNELL, A
WELL-REGULATED MILITIA].
19. Traditional Whig views of the militia may be found in the writings of the
Commonwealth tradition. See 3 JAMES BURGH, POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS 400–05
(Philadelphia, 1775); ANDREW FLETCHER, A DISCOURSE OF GOVERNMENT WITH
RELATION TO MILITIAS 40–41, 44–47 (Edinburgh, 1698); ALGERNON SIDNEY,
DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT Ch. 2 (London, 1698); JOHN TOLAND, THE
MILITIA REFORM’D 16, 46–47 (London, 1695). See generally JOHN TRENCHARD, AN
ARGUMENT SHEWING, THAT A STANDING ARMY IS INCONSISTENT WITH A FREE
GOVERNMENT AND ABSOLUTELY DESTRUCTIVE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ENGLISH MONARCHY (London, 1697).
20. 1 GEORGE MASON, Fairfax County Committee of Safety Proceedings, in THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 212 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970).
21. CORNELL, WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 18, at 18–19.
22. See CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 18, at 18–20. See
generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1992) (discussing the radicalism of the Revolution).
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That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people,
trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free
state; that standing armies, in time of peace, should be avoided, as
dangerous to liberty; and that, in all cases, the military should be
under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.23

Virginia’s Declaration of Rights made no mention of the right to
bear arms or a right of self-defense.24 The absence of such language
did not mean that Virginians did not esteem the right of self-defense;
rather, it merely underscored that they believed such a right was
adequately protected under the common law.25 The militia focus of
Mason’s language troubled Thomas Jefferson, one of the most
forward-looking and innovative legal thinkers in the Old Dominion.26
Jefferson proposed his own alternative to Mason’s language, which
included a more expansive statement of the right of individuals to
keep and use firearms.27 Jefferson first proposed that “no freeman
shall be debarred the use of arms” but decided to revise his proposal
to limit the exercise of this right.28 Under Jefferson’s revised
formulation, the right was confined to an individual’s home or lands.29
His revised proposal suggested that the Virginia Declaration of
Rights include language asserting that “no freeman shall be debarred
the use of arms [within his own lands or tenements].”30 Jefferson
obviously disagreed with the convention and sought to
constitutionalize the common law right of self-defense, but his
proposal was not enacted. His failed proposal, limiting the right to
arms to the home, mirrors the right that the majority asserted in
Heller.31

23. 1 GEORGE MASON, Final Draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, in THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 20, at 288; see also 1 GEORGE MASON,
Fairfax County Militia Plan “for Embodying the People”, in THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
MASON, supra note 20, at 215 [hereinafter MASON, Fairfax County Militia Plan].
Mason noted that the volunteer companies were an expedient until “a regular and
proper Militia law for the Defense of the Country shall be enacted by the Legislature
of this Colony.” Id. at 216; see also 1 GEORGE MASON, Virginia Declaration of
Rights, in THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 20, at 274–76.
24. See VA. CONST. of 1776.
25. See CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 18, at 26–30.
26. 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 344 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
27. See id. at 353.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 353, 363.
30. Id.
31. See id.; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 575–76 (2008).
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Virginia’s Constitution was crafted by members of a planter elite
who were often compared to the great leaders of the Roman
Republic, men such as Brutus or Cato. Pennsylvania’s Constitution,
the first to expressly protect a right to bear arms, owed far more to
plebeian ideas than to patrician ones.32 The framers of Pennsylvania’s
Constitution were men of humble origins who spoke on behalf of the
laboring classes and the industrious middling sorts, such as tradesmen
and small farmers.33 One prominent group that took a leading role in
crafting the Pennsylvania Constitution hailed from the western part
of the state. These men were animated by long-standing grievances
against the eastern Quaker elite who had dominated the legislature
for most of the colonial period. For more than a decade prior to
American independence, backcountry Pennsylvanians pressed for a
militia law to help them protect their communities against threats
from Indians along the frontier.34 The Quaker-dominated assembly
rebuffed these appeals, preferring to negotiate, not fight, with the
Native population.35 The most notorious incident in this decade-long
struggle was the Paxton Boys’ Uprising, the massacre of a group of
defenseless Conestoga Indians by backcountry Pennsylvanians in
1763.36 The Apology of the Paxton Volunteers framed their
grievances against the Pennsylvania government in the following
terms:
When we applied to the Government for Relief, the far greater part
of our Assembly were Quakers, some of whom made light of our
Sufferings & plead Conscience, so that they could neither take Arms
in Defense of themselves or their Country, nor form a Militia law to
oblige the Inhabitants to arm.37

32. For a discussion of the popular plebeian radicalism of Pennsylvania’s
constitutional tradition, see CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 18,
at 20–23.
33. The best historical account of the Pennsylvania arms bearing clause is found
in Nathan Kozuskanich, Defending Themselves: The Original Understanding of the
Right to Bear Arms, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1041, 1044–46 (2007).
34. Brief for Historians on Early American Legal, Constitutional and
Pennsylvania History as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, City of Chicago at
13–14, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521), 2010 WL
59031.
35. See id. at 15.
36. See KEVIN KENNY, PEACEABLE KINGDOM LOST: THE PAXTON BOYS AND THE
DESTRUCTION OF WILLIAM PENN’S HOLY EXPERIMENT 140–71 (2009).
37. The Apology of the Paxton Volunteers, in THE PAXTON PAPERS 187 (John R.
Dunbar ed., 1764).
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The text of the Paxton apology anticipated the language eventually
included by Pennsylvanians in their Declaration of Rights, which
asserted that the people had a right to “bear arms in defence of
themselves and the state.”38
There is no evidence from the
Revolutionary era that Pennsylvanians were concerned about threats
to the common-law right of individual self-defense. The Quakerdominated legislature had not attempted to disarm backcountry
inhabitants, nor had it passed laws that prevented them from
defending their homes against intruders.39 What the assembly refused
to do was enact a militia law or provide arms for frontier communities
to mount a concerted collective defense, including retaliatory raids on
Indian communities.40 The language eventually incorporated into the
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights reflected this bitter struggle over
public safety, and had little to do with public concern over an
individual right to keep arms for self-protection.41 The first discussion
of the right to bear arms in Pennsylvania’s Declaration of Rights
linked this to an obligation to support public defense.42 It also set a
pattern for other states by noting the need to balance the right to bear
arms against the equally important right not to be forced to bear
arms.43 This latter right was vital to religious pacifists opposed to
bearing arms, including Quakers and Mennonites. Thus, the first
clause to deal with the right to bear arms declared that:
[E]very member of society hath a right to be protected in the
enjoyment of life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to
contribute his proportion towards the expence of that protection,
and yield his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent
thereto: But no part of a man’s property can be justly taken from
him, or applied to public uses, without his consent, or that of his
legal representatives: Nor can any man who is conscientiously
scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly compelled thereto, if he will

38. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII.
39. Brief for Thirty-Four Professional Historians and Legal Historians as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020
(2010) (No. 08-1521), 2010 WL 59025.
40. See id. at 13.
41. See id. at 17–22.
42. See PA. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII.
43. See generally Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (2012) (discussing the significance of this neglected side of the right to bear
arms debate).
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pay such equivalent: Nor are the people bound by any laws but such
as they have in like manner assented, to for their common good.44

By including a right to bear arms and a right not to be forced to
bear arms, the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights struck a
compromise position between the opposing demands of the
backcountry residents and the pacifists. Only after asserting the civic
obligation
to
bear
arms
did
the
Constitution then affirm:
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of
themselves and the state; and as standing armies in the time of
peace, are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up: And
that the military should be kept under strict subordination, to, and
governed by, the civil power.45

As was invariably true in most Revolutionary-era constitutions, the
right to bear arms was also set against the danger posed by standing
armies, a juxtaposition that only accentuated the military character of
the right. Pennsylvania’s Constitution dealt with the private use of
arms in a separate context.46 The Pennsylvania Constitution explicitly
protected the right to hunt in a separate provision from the right to
bear arms.47 In contrast to England, where game laws made hunting
the exclusive province of the wealthy, Pennsylvania provided its
citizens with the “liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable times on the
lands they hold, and on all other lands therein not inclosed; and in
like manner to fish in all boatable waters, and others not private
property.”48 The formulation of this right implied a right of
government regulation, since hunting might be limited as to time,
place, and manner. Still, protecting the right of all citizens to hunt
made clear an opposition to the kinds of restrictions that the English
game laws codified and that were used to effectively disarm a
significant portion of the English population.49

44. PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, para. 13, reprinted in
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 78 (London,
1782); see also Kozuskanich, supra note 33, at 1065. Kozuskanich also deals with
anachronistic modern gun rights readings of this text.
45. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII.
46. See id., art. VIII.
47. See id. § 43.
48. Id.
49. See Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker’s Lecture Notes, the Second
Amendment, and Originalist Methodology: A Critical Comment, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 406, 407–08 (2009).
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Modern gun rights advocates read Pennsylvania’s arms bearing
provision as protecting an individual right, rewriting the text so that
the phrase “bear arms in defense of themselves” is synonymous with
the phrase “bear arms in defense of himself.”50 While the latter
individualistic formulation of the right gained currency in many
places in the nineteenth century, it did not gain broad acceptance in
state constitutions in the Founding era.51 Yet, even if one accepted
the anachronistic reading of Pennsylvania’s Constitution, it is hard to
justify using it as a model of Founding era constitutionalism. The
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 broke with nearly every standard
practice in America’s emerging constitutional culture. Pennsylvania
rejected a unicameral legislature and a unitary executive, instead
entrusting aspects of judicial review to the Council of Censors, a body
charged with preserving the Constitution inviolate.52 Pennsylvania’s
Constitution was controversial from its inception. John Adams
wrote, “Good God! The people of Pennsylvania in seven years will be
glad to petition the Crown of Britain for reconciliation in order to be
delivered from the tyranny of their new Constitution.”53
Neither Virginia nor Pennsylvania expressly protected a right to
“keep and bear arms.”54 The first state to introduce this language into
American law was Massachusetts. The 1780 Constitution adopted by
the State declared that:

50. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 601 (2008).
51. Supporters of the individual rights reading of the 1776 Pennsylvania
Constitution have been unable to identify any contemporary evidence that this was
the dominant understanding of its framers or the general understanding of
Pennsylvanians. Instead, they have used James Wilson’s comments on the 1790
Constitution as the basis for reconstructing the meaning of the earlier document. Not
only did two different bodies draft these provisions, but they structured and worded
them differently. Thus, the earlier provision links the right to bear arms with the
traditional Whig attack on standing armies. The latter provision clearly separates the
two ideas into separate provisions. It is also not entirely clear how typical Wilson’s
thinking was on this question. Albert Gallatin, another member of the 1790
convention, framed the right in rather different terms, giving it a more clearly
military reading. Nor do Pennsylvania courts appear to have seen this provision as
having constitutionalized the common law right of self-defense. For further
discussion and analysis of this controversy and the relevant sources, see Kozuskanich,
supra note 33. On the changing language of the arms bearing provisions of state
constitutions, see CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 18.
52. See PA. CONST. of 1776.
53. William Pencak, The Promise of the Revolution, 1750-1800, in
PENNSYLVANIA: A HISTORY OF THE COMMONWEALTH 121 (William Pencak &
Randal Miller eds., 2002) (quoting John Adams).
54. See generally VA. CONST. of 1776; PA. CONST. of 1776.
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The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common
defence. And as in time of peace armies are dangerous to liberty
they ought not to be maintained without the consent of the
legislature; and the military power shall always be held in an exact
subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it.55

The convention’s inclusion of the word “keep” built on an
assumption implicit in the state’s militia statute, which had been
enacted in the colonial era.56 Apart from the poor, most white male
citizens were required to outfit themselves with military-quality
weapons.57 As was true for virtually every state’s militia laws,
muskets, not pistols, were the legally designated weapon of the
militia. The only exception to this were the horsemen’s pistols
required of dragoons and other mounted units.58
One of most remarkable features of the framing and ratification of
the Massachusetts Constitution was the decision to submit the draft
constitution to the towns for comment. These responses provide a
rare glimpse into popular constitutional ideas in the Founding era,
including ideas about armed self-defense.59 Although individual
towns produced dozens of detailed responses to the proposed
constitution and identified many flaws in the new frame of
government, the right to keep and bear arms did not prompt
extensive commentary. The response of the western town of
Williamsburgh, however, faulted the constitution’s exclusive focus on
common defense and proposed the following alternative: “1st that we
esteem it an essential privilege to keep Arms in Our houses for Our
Own Defence and while we Continue honest and Lawfull Subjects of
Government we Ought Never to be deprived of them.”60
This alternative formulation clearly frames the right in terms
similar to Heller’s core right of self-defense in the home.61 This
limited formulation of the right was also evidenced in the language

55. MASS CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XVII, in THE POPULAR SOURCES OF
POLITICAL AUTHORITY 446 (Oscar Handlin & Mary Handlin eds., 1966).
56. CORNELL, WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 18, at 12.
57. For a discussion of colonial militia laws, see id. at 14–17.
58. For a good example from the era of the Second Amendment, see An Act for

Regulating and Governing the Militia of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
(1793), reprinted in ACTS AND RESOLVES PASSED BY THE GENERAL COURT 294
(Wright & Potter Printing Co. 1895) [hereinafter Massachusetts Act].
59. See generally supra note 55 and accompanying text.
60. Town of Williamsburgh (1780), in THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL
AUTHORITY, supra note 55, at 624.
61. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
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chosen by Samuel Adams in his proposed amendment submitted to,
but ultimately rejected by, the Massachusetts Ratification
Convention.62 Similar to the town of Williamsburgh, Adams defined
the contours of the right in terms of an individual right for one’s own
defense.63
Although there is little doubt that Adams and other Americans
believed they had a legal right to defend their homes with deadly
force if necessary, there is no evidence that there was broad legal
consensus that states needed to constitutionalize the protection of this
right outside of the home.64 Balancing the needs of public safety
against the exercise of this right was something best left to the
individual state legislatures.65
III. GUN REGULATION IN THE FOUNDING ERA AND EARLY
REPUBLIC: MYTHS AND REALITIES
It is important to recognize that the Founding generation had little
trouble accepting that one might have different legal standards for the
use of arms within the home and in public. Thomas Jefferson’s legal
thoughts provide yet another example of this type of legal double
standard for arms. In a bill he wrote to deal with poaching, Jefferson
included a provision restricting the ability to travel armed with a
musket outside of the context of militia activity.66 The proposed law
penalized any poacher who “bear[s] a gun out of his inclosed ground,
unless whilst performing military duty.”67 The purpose of the statute
was to make legal distinctions between the different levels of
regulation appropriate to the use of firearms in different contexts.68
In public, militia weapons enjoyed greater legal protection than
62. See id. at 601.
63. See id.; see also Town of Williamsburgh (1780), supra note 60, at 624.
64. Even if one canvassed the most expansive statements of the right from the
ratification debates, none of these can plausibly be read to justify traveling armed. In
this regard, the language proposed by Samuel Adams, which implicates a home-based
right, is instructive. See sources cited supra, note 63. Even accepting Heller’s dubious
claims that the phrase “bear arms” simply meant to carry a gun and had no
connection to the militia, one could easily imagine that the right to carry such a gun
did not extend beyond the home, which is precisely the conception defended by
Jefferson, Adams, and the residents of Williamsburgh.
65. See discussions of Brutus and Tench Coxe, infra Part III, and the idea of
federalism embodied in the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
66. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Preservation of Deer, in 2 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 444 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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pistols and other non-military weapons. All weapons, even those
owned for militia purposes, were subject to police power regulation.69
Although there were hundreds of essays published both for and
against the Constitution, the subject of hunting and the right of selfdefense outside the home produced little commentary.70 Indeed,
there is pretty strong evidence that Federalists and Anti-Federalists
each saw these issues as matters best left to the state legislatures.71
Although Federalist Tench Coxe and the Anti-Federalist author
Brutus agreed on few things, they were in complete agreement on this
issue. Brutus made this point expressly when he wrote, “[I]t ought to
be left to the state governments to provide for the protection and
defence of the citizen against the hand of private violence, and the
wrongs done or attempted by individuals to each other . . . .”72
Federalist Tench Coxe echoed this understanding, writing that “[t]he
states will regulate and administer the criminal law, exclusively of
Congress.”73 The police power of the states would not be diminished
under the new Constitution and the individual states would continue
to legislate on all matters “such as unlicensed public houses,
nuisances, and many other things of the like nature.”74
Although individual laws varied, a number of states expressly
provided that weapons owned in relation to militia service were
exempt from seizure in any legal proceedings for debt or delinquent

69. There is broad consensus among professional historians on this point. See,
e.g., Brief for Thirty-Four Professional Historians and Legal Historians as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5–12, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct.
3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521), 2010 WL 59025, at *4–6. The distinguished Massachusetts
judge George Thatcher wrote about the right to use arms in analogous terms and
recognized the breadth of the state’s police power in this area. See Saul Cornell, The
Original Meaning Of Original Understanding: A Neo-Blackstonian Critique, 67 MD.
L. REV. 150, 161 (2007). Thatcher’s thinking has been largely ignored by judges and
legal scholars but merits closer attention. See id. For a more detailed discussion of
Thatcher, see Patrick J. Charles, Scribble Scrabble, the Second Amendment, and

Historical Guideposts: A Short Reply to Lawrence Rosenthal and Joyce Lee
Malcolm, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 227 (2011).
70. See Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of
Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103 (2000).
71. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 71–74.
72. BRUTUS, ESSAYS OF BRUTUS VII, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 358, 400–05 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
73. Tench Coxe, A Freeman, PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 1788, reprinted in FRIENDS
OF THE CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE “OTHER” FEDERALISTS 82 (Colleen A.
Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998).
74. Id.
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taxes.75 The treatment in a Philadelphia edition of the Conductor
Generalis, a guidebook for justices of the peace, sheriffs, and
constables devoted a long section to goods which were subject to a
“distress for rent” action.76 Although tradesmen’s tools were exempt,
no provision was made for firearms, apart from muskets and rifles
owned by militiamen.77 A comparable guide written for sheriffs and
tax collectors residing in Maine, published more than three decades
later, evidenced a similar rule.78 While clothes, bibles, schoolbooks,
and tools necessary for a trade were exempt, the only firearms
accorded this privilege were those of the militia.79 As The Maine Civil
Officer put it, “[e]very citizen enrolled, and providing himself with
the arms, ammunition, and accoutrements required by law, shall hold
the same exempt from all suits, distresses, execution or sale for debts,
or for the payment of taxes.”80
Patterns of gun ownership in the Founding era also help account
for the very different legal protections accorded ordinary pistols and
militia weapons. 81 Americans owned many more long guns and the

75. THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, OR, THE
THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 142 (1792).

OFFICE, DUTY,

AND

AUTHORITY

OF

76. Id. at 142-43.
77. Id. at 142.
78. JEREMIAH PERLEY, THE MAINE CIVIL OFFICER OR THE POWERS AND DUTIES
OF SHERIFFS, CORONERS, CONSTABLES, AND COLLECTORS OF TAXES 29-30 (1825).
The statute describing this legal exemption was passed in 1792. For similar
discussions from a New Jersey guide from the same period, see JAMES EWING, A
TREATISE ON THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 70 (1832).
79. See PERLEY, supra note 78, at 29–30.
80. Id.
81. The question of exactly how well-armed Americans were in the eighteenth
century has been an explosive one. No serious scholar now accepts the discredited
argument of Michael Bellesiles that Americans were poorly armed. See generally
MICHAEL BELLESILES, ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL GUN
CULTURE (2000). For devastating critiques of his thesis, see Ira D. Gruber, Of Arms
and Men: Arming America and Military History, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 217 (2002);
James Lindgren & Justin Lee Heather, Counting Guns in Early America, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1777 (2002); Gloria L. Main, Many Things Forgotten: The Use of
Probate Records in Arming America, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 211 (2002); Randolph
Roth, Guns, Gun Culture, and Homicide: The Relationship between Firearms, the
Uses of Firearms, and Interpersonal Violence, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 223 (2002).
Among the many blunders made by Bellesiles, he failed to distinguish between
pistols and long guns. In an important new study of the patterns of arms ownership
in the eighteenth century, Amherst College social historian Kevin Sweeny notes that
pistols constituted a small fraction of the weapons owned by Americans in the
Founding era. Americans clearly preferred long guns over hand guns. See Kevin
Sweeney, Firearms and Colonial Militias, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL:
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law bestowed additional constitutional and legal protections on such
weapons, including a right to travel to muster and train with these
weapons, recognizing the utility of these weapons for militia activity.82
Yet, it is worth noting that even these militia weapons were subject to
reasonable police power regulations.83
The notion that the use of militia weapons outside of the home
enjoyed even greater protection than the use of pistols outside of the
home makes perfect sense given the language of the Second
Amendment. Although Heller held that self-defense in the home was
one core value enshrined in the Second Amendment, it is hard to
dispute that the Amendment also protects the goal of arming the
militia.84 Because pistols had little value in hunting and were not
standard equipment for ordinary militiamen, it made sense to carve
out a broader right to travel with a musket or a rifle since these
weapons were needed for training and suitable for hunting.85
Although one might travel with a musket to muster, the state could
prohibit traveling with a loaded weapon or discharging a weapon on a
muster day without permission.86
It is easy to mischaracterize the Founding era’s recognition that
militia weapons might be used in public with a broad right to carry
arms. Michael O’Shea, a gun rights scholar, makes this error in his
gloss on a well-known passage from the Virginia jurist, St. George
Tucker.87 In his discussion of the law of treason, Tucker commented
on the right to carry a musket in his home state of Virginia. Tucker
noted that simply carrying military weapons in Virginia did not imply

CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER (forthcoming 2013) [copy
on file with author].
82. See sources cited supra note 81.
83. See Massachusetts Act, supra note 58, at 380; see also District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 633–34 (2008).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
85. See An Act Concerning the Militia § 120, 1866 Mass. Acts 197 (“A soldier
who unnecessarily or without order from a superior officer comes to any parade with
his musket, rifle or pistol loaded with ball, slug or shot, or so loads the same while on
parade, or unnecessarily or without order from a superior officer discharges the same
when going to, or returning from or upon parade, shall forfeit not less than five nor
more than twenty dollars.”); An Act for the Regulating, Training and Arraying of the
Militia, pt. 11, 1778 N.J. Laws 45; An Act for Forming and Regulating the Militia
Within this State, and for Repealing All the Laws Heretofore Made for that Purpose
§ 7, 1786 N.H. Laws 409.
86. See generally 1785 Va. Acts 9.
87. See Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry
Arms: Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM.
U. L. REV. 585, 637 (2012).
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any treasonous intent, a fact that marked a departure from English
precedents. O’Shea ignores the clear military context of Tucker’s
discussion, eliding the difference between a right to carry militia
weapons outside of the home and the right to carry a pistol for selfdefense.
Tucker’s discussion of this issue responded to the
prosecution of Fries’s Rebellion in Pennsylvania.88 Tucker took
exception to Judge Samuel Chase’s use of English legal authorities in
construing the meaning of treason.89 Tucker noted that in contrast to
English law, the mere possession and use of military style weapons
did not provide grounds for a treason prosecution in Virginia:
But ought that circumstances of itself [array with military weapons],
to create any such presumption in America, where the right to bear
arms is recognized and secured in the constitution itself. In many
parts of the United States, a man no more thinks, of going out of his
house on any occasion, without his rifle or musket in his hand, than
an European fine gentleman without his sword by his side.90

Tucker’s remarks are easily taken out of context and
misinterpreted, so it is worth taking the time to highlight exactly what
he claimed. The first point to recognize is that Tucker was talking
about the use of military weapons by citizens who would have been
members of the eighteenth-century militia.91 Tucker is quite clear
that muskets and rifles, not pistols, are protected by this
constitutional right.92
Second, Tucker himself notes that this
expansive conception of a constitutional right to carry military
weapons in public was not universally acknowledged by all judges at
the time. Justice Chase certainly did not share Tucker’s views and the
successful prosecution of the rebels in both the Whiskey Rebellion
and Fries’s Rebellion demonstrate that Tucker’s views were not the
norm outside of Virginia.93

88. See generally PAUL DOUGLAS NEWMAN, FRIES’S REBELLION: THE ENDURING
STRUGGLE FOR THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2004).
89. 5 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES; AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, app. B at 14 (Phila.,
William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) [hereinafter TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES].
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
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In Masciandaro, Judge Niemeyer noted the Second Amendment
not only protected self-defense but also had to be read with its militia
purpose in mind:
Moreover, the right to keep and bear arms was found to have been
understood to exist not only for self-defense, but also for
membership in a militia and for hunting, neither of which is a homebound activity. Indeed, one aspect of the right, as historically
understood, was “to secure the ideal of a citizen militia, which might
be necessary to oppose an oppressive military force if the
constitutional order broke down.”94

Judge Niemeyer extrapolates a right to carry a firearm from an
unquestioned historical assumption about the way the militia
functioned. Niemeyer seems to assume that one would have needed
to travel with a loaded gun to participate in the militia and effectuate
the Second Amendment’s militia purpose. Yet, in the case of the
Second Amendment, historical facts and mythology are often at odds
with one another. In fact, states regulated the exercise of this right in
a robust manner, including prohibiting militiamen from traveling with
a loaded weapon to muster or parade.95 These types of regulations
were uncontroversial exercises of the state’s police powers.96
Finally, one must reckon with the common law constraints on the
use of firearms in the Founding era and early republic. The Statute of
Northampton instructed individuals to “bring no force in affray of the
peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in fairs,
markets.”97 Modern scholars are divided over how to interpret the
application of this statute in early American law. In the view of Daryl
Miller and Patrick Charles, the Statute of Northampton prohibited

94. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (2011) (Niemeyer, J.,
concurring) (internal citations omitted).
95. See, e.g., STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 765 (Trenton, Phillips &
Bogswell 1847); see also THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
161 (Concord, John F. Brown 1851). Note that “parade” in this context is an
essential part of the muster, in which weapons are inspected and fines levied. See
generally 5 Military Affairs AMERICAN STATE PAPERS. DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE
AND EXECUTIVE, OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE FIRST SESSION
OF THE TWENTY-SECOND TO THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH CONGRESS,
INCLUSIVE: COMMENCING MARCH 15, 1832, AND ENDING JANUARY 5, 1836 451-2
(Asbury Dickins & John W. Forney eds., Gales & Seaton 1860).
96. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 1–51 (1996).
97. Statute of Northampton, 1328, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.), available at http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/print_documents/amendIIs1.html.
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armed travel.98 Eugene Volokh, a leading academic champion of gun
rights, rejects this view. He argues that this “Statute was understood
by the Framers as covering only those circumstances where carrying
arms was unusual and therefore terrifying.”99 Volokh cites the
interpretation of this statue by Sir William Hawkins, an important
English legal commentator familiar to lawyers in the Founding era.100
Hawkins formulation of this statute’s prohibition cast the prohibition
in terms of traveling with unusual and dangerous weapons.101 This
formulation was slightly different than Sir William Blackstone’s gloss
on the law. Blackstone did not describe the crime of affray in terms
of traveling with “dangerous and unusual weapons,” but described
the statute’s prohibition in terms of carrying “dangerous or unusual
weapons.”102
The Founders were familiar with both English
commentators and it seems likely that there may have been a range of
views on interpreting this question.103
It is easy for legal scholars and judges to lose sight of the social,
cultural, and political contexts in which early American weapons
regulations were enacted. Founding era public policy on firearms had
several objectives: disarm dangerous and disloyal groups, provide for
the safe storage of gunpowder and firearms, and arm and regulate the
militia.104 Interpersonal violence, including gun violence, simply was
not a problem in the Founding era that warranted much attention and
therefore produced no legislation.105 Times change, and the law
98. See Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the
Home: History Versus Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 8
(2012); Darrell A. H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second
Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1317 (2009).
99. Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 97, 101 (2009).
100. See id.
101. Id. Hawkins clearly believed one might not travel with offensive weapons.
Defensive use of weapons in the home was clearly protected, but it is not clear how
far this right extended beyond the home for the ordinary person. Hawkins expressly
noted that “persons of quality,” a term that signified elite status and class rank, were
not subject to arms restrictions in public. Thus, the right that Hawkins defined seems
narrow, not expansive in scope. Id.
102. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148–49 (1803).
103. St. George Tucker quotes both authors as good authority on the common law,
but also notes that the common law had been modified in each of the American
states. See 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 89, at *409.
104. For a discussion of early American gun regulation, see Saul Cornell & Nathan
DeDino, A Well-Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of Gun Control, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 491–505 (2004).
105. With the notable exception of laws addressing dueling, see An Act for the
Punishing and Preventing of Duelling, 1719 Mass. Acts 135.
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changes with them.106 As cheaper and more reliable handguns
proliferated in large numbers and society underwent a host of
profound social and economic changes in the early decades of the
nineteenth century, handguns and knives gradually became a social
problem.107 In response to a growing perception that these easilyconcealable weapons posed a serious threat to public safety, a
number of states passed the first modern-style weapons control
laws.108 These laws triggered the first cases testing the scope of the
constitutional right to keep and bear arms under state law.109 For the
first time in American history, courts were faced with deciding this
issue: was the constitutional right to bear arms implicated when one
armed oneself with a pistol or a knife outside of the home?110
In Masciandaro, Judge Niemeyer relied on Eugene Volokh’s
framework for implementing Heller.111
Unfortunately, this
framework rests on a number of questionable historical assumptions
and claims. In particular, the contention that the “pre-Civil War
American legal practice of treating open carrying of weapons as not
only legal but constitutionally protected” rests more on historical
mythology and a highly selective reading of the evidence than it does
on sound historical research.112 In reality, Antebellum case law on the
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See generally RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE (2009).
See CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA, supra note 18, at 137–50.
See infra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
See id.

United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011).
Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, supra note 99, at 102;
see also Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for SelfDefense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443,
1516-17, 1522-23 (2009) [hereinafter Volokh, Implementing]. To illustrate this view,
Volokh quotes Willie Nelson’s Pancho & Lefty. See id. at 1523 n.331 (quoting WILLIE
NELSON, PANCHO & LEFTY (Sony Records 1990)). Vololkh acknowledges that “this
is a modern source, of course, but one that also captures well the 1800s sentiments.”
Id. The song was actually written by Townes Van Zandt, who first recorded it on his
1972 album, THE LATE GREAT TOWNES VAN ZANDT. Without diminishing the
artistry of Willie Nelson, or the song’s actual author, Townes Van Zandt, I think it is
fair to say that the source tells us more about historical myth, than reality. Volokh’s
inability to distinguish between myth and reality ought to raise additional concerns
about his analysis. For a brilliant exploration of such myths, including the
appropriation of some aspects of the Mexican revolutionary figure Pancho Villa’s life
by American artists and entertainers, see RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION:
THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1998). If the song
in part draws inspiration from Pancho Villa, it would be evidence for a twentieth
century mythology, not a mythology associated with the 1800s. For additional
analysis of how Volokh’s questionable forays into law office history led the Supreme
Court astray in Heller, see Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office
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right to bear arms was deeply divided on the scope of the right.113
There was a spectrum that ran from the libertarian view elaborated in
Bliss v. Commonwealth114 to the more limited right described in
Buzzard v. State.115 The Fourteenth Amendment largely resolved the
division among southern Antebellum courts evidenced by this split.
By the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, most legal
commentators viewed Buzzard, not Bliss, as the orthodox view.116
Legal scholarship is most trustworthy when focused on traditional
doctrinal analysis. Yet, narrow doctrinalism can obscure other
important legal and historical sources, particularly if one focuses
exclusively on cases and ignores legislation. In areas of the law in
which a broad constitutional consensus existed and laws were not
challenged there would not be any body of case law to consult. If one
looks at legal scholarship on the right to bear arms, one of the most
striking omissions is any attention to the law outside of the South.117
Indeed, nearly all of the Antebellum gun cases, with a few notable
exceptions, were decided in Southern courts by judges who were
typically pro-slavery.118 This fact merits closer scrutiny.119

History: “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1111–
12 (2009) and David Thomas Konig, The Second Amendment: A Missing
Transatlantic Context for the Historical Meaning of “the Right of the People to Keep
and Bear Arms,” 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 119, 154 n.96 (2004).
113. See infra notes 120–29 and accompanying text.
114. Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822).
115. State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 27 (1842).
116. For a discussion of the spectrum of antebellum jurisprudence and case law,
see Saul Cornell & Justin Florence, The Right to Bear Arms in the Era of the
Fourteenth Amendment: Gun Rights or Gun Regulation?, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1043, 1052–53 (2010). Compare Bliss, 12 Ky. 90 (declaring that Kentucky’s concealedweapons ban conflicted with the state constitution), superseded by state
constitutional amendment, KY. CONST. of 1850 art. XIII, § 25, with Buzzard, 4 Ark. at
27 (upholding arms regulation statute against constitutional challenge). Volokh
argues that in the aftermath of McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010),
legal ideas and norms in the 1860s and 1870s are probative in evaluating
contemporary gun regulations. See Volokh, Implementing, supra note 112, at 1524.
For the opposing view, see Rostron, supra note 8.
117. For a good illustration of the problems of narrow doctrinalism, see generally
Volokh, Implementing, supra note 112, and O’Shea, supra note 87, at 623–41.
118. The most important counterexamples from non-southern sources are a trio of
Indiana cases: State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833); Walls v. State, 7 Blackf. 572
(Ind. 1845); State v. Duzan, 6 Blackf. 31 (Ind. 1841). Of course, southern migration
into Indiana may well account for these developments. As historian Nicole Etcheson
observes, “forty-four percent of such Hoosiers, thirty-five percent of such Illinoisans,
and nineteen percent of such Ohioans were reported born in the Upland South.
Since the southerners were the first migrants into these states, these figures disguise
an even larger southern presence because the children and grandchildren of
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IV. THE PISTOL AND THE LASH: SLAVERY AND THE PERMISSIVE
RIGHT TO CARRY
It is not surprising that the vast majority of the early cases testing
the limits and scope of the right to bear arms were Southern. By the
1820s, the Antebellum South was the most violent region in the new
nation.120 Indeed, the South’s homicide rates were more than double
that of the North’s most populous cities, New York and
Philadelphia.121 Given the much higher homicide rates in the South, it
is not surprising that this region led the way in passing the first
modern style gun control laws.122
Southern violence prompted extensive commentary by
contemporaries and was put to effective use by abolitionists who
linked this culture of violence to the brutality of slavery.123 Two
particular symbols became emblems of the violence of the South: the
pistol and the lash.124 The importance of these cultural associations is
vividly captured in this cartoon from The American Anti-Slavery
Almanac (1840)125:

southerners were counted as born in Ohio, Indiana, or Illinois.” Nicole Etcheson,
Manliness and the Political Culture of the Old Northwest, 1790–1860, 15 J. EARLY
REP. 59, 60 n.2 (1995).
119. I would like to thank Professor Al Brophy of the University of North Carolina
School of Law for suggesting this line of inquiry to me.
120. See ROTH, supra note 106. Urban areas also experienced a rise in the use of
weapons. See ERIC H. MONKKONEN, MURDER IN NEW YORK CITY (2001); see also
Joshua Stein, Privatizing Violence: A Transformation in the Jurisprudence of
Assault, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 423, 445 (2012) (noting that in the three decades
between 1810 and 1840 assaults rose dramatically as did the likelihood that such
assaults would involve a weapon).
121. See ROTH, supra note 106.
122. On Southern violence, see DICKSON D. BRUCE, JR., VIOLENCE AND CULTURE
IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1979) and BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN
HONOR: ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH (1982).
123. See generally Bruce, supra note 122.
124. Id.
125. Our Peculiar Domestic Institutions, reprinted in THE AMERICAN ANTISLAVERY ALMANAC 25 (New York, Am. Anti-Slavery Soc’y 1840), available at
http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/dgkeysearchdetail.cfm?imageID=413034.
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The scene depicted in the image melds together multiple examples
of southern brutality. In the distance, a cockfight draws a large crowd
seeking the titillation provided by blood sport. A gambling dispute
turned deadly occupies the center of the picture. On one side of the
image, two gentlemen are about to fire on one another in a duel and a
cruel southern master prepares to whip a young slave. The fact that
the South was the most violent region of the new nation ought to give
scholars and judges pause before looking to this region for
constitutional guidelines on how to interpret the meaning of the right
to bear arms in the post-Heller era.
If one looks closely at the foundation for Professor Volokh’s claim
about the right to carry, it consists of a single and quite remarkable
statement by the Richmond Grand Jury published in 1820.126 The
Grand Jury denounced the pernicious practice of carrying concealed
weapons, while affirming the right to carry arms openly.
On Wearing Concealed Arms
We, the Grand Jury for the city of Richmond, at August Court,
1820, do not believe it to be inconsistent with our duty to
animadvert upon any practice which, in our opinion, may be
attended with consequences dangerous to the peace and good order
of society. We have observed, with regret, the very numerous
instances of stabbing, which have of late years occurred, and which
have been owing in most cases to the practice which has so
frequently prevailed, of wearing dirks: Armed in secret, and

126. See Volokh, Implementing, supra note 112.
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emboldened by the possession of these deadly weapons, how
frequently have disputes been carried to extremities, which might
otherwise have been either amicably adjusted, or attended with no
serious consequences to the parties engaged.
The Grand Jury would not recommend any legislative interference
with what they conceive to be one of the most essential privileges of
freemen, the right of carrying arms: But we feel it our duty publicly
to express our abhorrence of a practice which it becomes all good
citizens to frown upon with contempt, and to endeavor to suppress.
We consider the practice of carrying arms secreted, in cases where
no personal attack can reasonably be apprehended, to be infinitely
more reprehensible than even the act of stabbing, if committed
during a sudden affray, in the heat of passion, where the party was
not previously armed for the purpose.127

The idea that one might ban concealed carry if one allowed open
carry did garner support in Nunn v. State, but there is little evidence
that this case was understood to be a controlling precedent in the
South, and it was certainly not viewed in this way by the era of the
Fourteenth Amendment.128 In Hill v. State, Georgia’s Supreme Court
rejected Nunn and asserted that it was “at a loss to follow the line of
thought that extends the guarantee . . . to the right to carry pistols,
dirks, Bowie-knives, and those other weapons of like character,
which, as all admit, are the greatest nuisances of our day.”129
Moreover, Nunn had no impact outside of the South. Indeed,
scholarship on the right to bear arms had been strangely silent about
legal ideas and practices in these other areas of the nation, which
included the vast majority of the free population.

127. On Wearing Concealed Arms, DAILY NAT’L. INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 9, 1820, at
2.
128. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 243 (1846). For the pro-slavery beliefs of Judge
Lumpkin, the author of the Nunn decision, see Mason W. Stephenson & D. Grier
Stephenson, Jr., “To Protect and Defend”: Joseph Henry Lumpkin, The Supreme
Court of Georgia, and Slavery, 25 EMORY L.J. 579, 582-86 (1976). For a discussion of
how the antebellum tradition was interpreted during the era of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Cornell & Florence, supra note 116, at 1066–69. For good examples
of other antebellum models, see generally Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840) and
State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842).
129. Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 474 (1874) (rejecting the logic of Nunn, but assuming
arguendo that the law in question was constitutional even if Nunn were correctly
decided).
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V. NO RIGHT TO CARRY: THE EMERGENCE AND SPREAD OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS MODEL
Outside of the South, a robust model of weapons regulation
emerged and gained widespread acceptance.
Prohibitions on
concealed carry were one type of regulation.130 A number of states
and localities adapted the Statute of Northampton’s prohibition on
traveling armed, rewriting it in terms that made clear that one cannot
travel with offensive weapons.131 Laws of this type weren’t the only
prohibitions on traveling armed. States enacted bans on the use of
arms in sensitive places.132 Finally, some states and localities enacted

130. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 929 (1881) (“If any person shall carry upon his
person any concealed weapon . . . [he] shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . not more than thirty
days . . . .”); 1883 WIS. SESS. LAWS 713 (“To regulate or prohibit the carrying or
wearing by any person under his clothes, or concealed about his person, of any pistol
or colt, or slung shot, or cross knuckles, or knuckles of lead, brass or other metal, or
bowie knife, dirk knife, or dirk or dagger, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon;
and to provide for the confiscation or sale of such weapon.”).
131. There are many examples of laws prohibiting offensively arming oneself. See
1849 Cal. Stat. 245 (“[I]f any person shall have upon him any pistol, gun, knife, dirk,
bludgeon, or other offensive weapon, with intent to assault any person, every such
person, on conviction, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars or
imprisoned in the County Jail not more than three months.”); 19 Del. Laws 733
(1852) (“Any justice of the peace may also cause to be arrested . . . all who go armed
offensively to the terror of the people, or are otherwise disorderly and dangerous.”).
132. See 1870 La. Acts 61 (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to carry any gun,
pistol, bowie-knife or other dangerous weapon, concealed or unconcealed, on any
day of election during the hours the polls are open, or on any day of registration or
revision of registration, within a distance of one-half mile of any place of registration
or revision of registration; any person violating the provisions of this section shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.”); 1870 Tex. Gen. Laws 63 (“[I]f any person shall
go into any church or religious assembly, any school room or other place where
persons are assembled for educational, literary or scientific purposes, or into a
ballroom, social party or other social gathering composed of ladies and gentlemen, or
to any election precinct on the day or days of any election, where any portion of the
people of this State are collected to vote at any election, or to any other place where
people may be assembled to muster or to perform any other public duty, or any other
public assembly, and shall have about his person a bowie knife, dirk or butcher knife,
or fire-arms, whether known as a six shooter, gun or pistol of any kind, such person
so offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof
shall be fined in a sum not less than fifty or more than five hundred dollars, at the
discretion of the court or jury trying the same . . . .”); 1878 Va. Acts 37 (“If any
person carrying any gun, pistol, bowie-knife, dagger, or other dangerous weapon, to
any place of worship while a meeting for religious purposes is being held at such
place, or without good and sufficient cause therefor, shall carry any such weapon on
Sunday at any place other than his own premises, shall be fined not less than twenty
dollars.”); 1859 Wash. Sess. Laws 489 (“Every person who shall convey into any
penitentiary, jail or house of correction, or house of reformation, any disguise, or any
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even more sweeping regulations, including complete bans on
traveling armed. In 1835, Massachusetts passed a sweeping law that
effectively prohibited the right to travel armed.
If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or
other offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to
fear an assault or other injury, or violence to his person, or to his
family or property, he may on complaint of any person having
reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace, be
required to find sureties for keeping the peace.133

The respected jurist Peter Oxenbridge Thacher commented on this
law in a grand jury charge that drew praise in the contemporary
press.134 According to this model, one might ban open and concealed
carry, as long as one allowed an exception for cases in which an
individual had a reasonable fear of imminent violence.135
Volokh is correct that bans on concealed weapons were
uncontroversial. It is therefore hardly surprising that Thacher shared
the dominant cultural view of the day regarding the practice of
arming oneself with concealed weapons. Such a practice was
cowardly, if not dastardly. This did not mean that one had a right to
carry openly. The alternative to concealed carry was not open carry,
but rigorous enforcement of the law, which forbade arming oneself
except in unusual situations. Thacher’s grand jury charge was
emphatic about the limited nature of this right:
In our own Commonwealth [of Massachusetts], no person may go
armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and
dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to apprehend an
assault or violence to his person, family, or property. Where the
practice of wearing secret arms prevails, it indicates either that the
instrument, tool, weapon or other thing, adapted to or useful in aiding any prisoner
there lawfully committed or detained, to make escape . . . shall, on conviction thereof,
be imprisoned . . . .”).
133. 1835 Mass. Acts 750.
134. See PETER OXENBRIDGE THACHER, TWO CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY OF
THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, AT THE
OPENING OF TERMS OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, ON
MONDAY, DECEMBER 5TH, A.D. 1836 AND ON MONDAY, MARCH 13TH, A.D. 27-28
(1837). The section of the grand jury charge dealing with traveling armed was
excerpted and reprinted in Judge Thacher’s Charges, CHRISTIAN REGISTER &
BOSTON OBSERVER, June 10, 1837, at 91. For additional discussion of the
Massachusetts model, see ELISHA HAMMOND, A PRACTICAL TREATISE; OR AN
ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW APPERTAINING TO THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE; AND ALSO RELATING TO THE PRACTICE IN JUSTICES’ COURTS, IN CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL MATTERS, WITH APPROPRIATE FORMS OF PRACTICE 184–86 (1841).
135. See sources cited supra note 130.
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laws are bad; or that they are not executed with vigor; or, at least, it
proves want of confidence in their protection. It often leads to the
sudden commission of acts of atrocious injury; and induces the
individual to rely for defence on himself, rather than on society. But
how vain and impotent is the power of a single arm, however skilled
in the science of defence, to protect its possessor from the many evil
persons who infest society. The possession of a concealed dagger is
apt to produce an elation of mind, which raises itself above the
dictates both of prudence and law. The possessor, stimulated by a
sensitive notion of honor, and constituting himself the sole judge of
his rights, may suddenly commit a deed, for which a life of penitence
will hardly, even in his own estimation, atone. When you survey the
society to which you belong, and consider the various wants of its
members;—their numbers, their variety of occupation and
character,—their conflicting interests and wants . . . what is it, permit
me to ask, preserves the common peace and safety? I know of no
answer, but THE LAW.136

Thacher’s account of the Massachusetts law prohibiting the right to
carry arms unambiguously interprets this law as a broad ban on the
use of arms in public. In Massachusetts and those states emulating its
model, the scope of the right to arm oneself defensively outside of the
home was extremely limited.137 Thacher believed that the state could
ban all carrying of firearms, as long as there was an affirmative legal
defense available allowing an exception when there was a clear and
tangible threat to justify arming oneself defensively.138 Demonstrating
a reasonable fear, it is important to note, imposed a high legal
standard. In State v. Duke, the Supreme Court of Texas upheld a
comprehensive ban on traveling armed.139 Texas law also defined the
standard of reasonableness in the following way:
Any person charged under the first Section of this Act, who may
offer to prove by way of defense, that he was in danger of an attack
on his person, or unlawful interference with his property, shall be
required to show that such danger was immediate and pressing, and
was of such a nature as to alarm a person of ordinary courage; and
that the arms so carried were borne openly, and not concealed
beneath the clothing; and if it shall appear that this danger had its

136.
137.
138.
139.

Judge Thacher’s Charges, supra note 134, at 91.
See sources cited infra note 141.
See id.
See State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 459 (1874).
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origin in a difficulty first commenced by the accused, it shall not be
considered a legal defense.140

The case also drew a clear line between the use of arms within the
home and the use of them in public. The former enjoyed far greater
protection than the latter. Thus, even in the region of the nation with
the most permissive attitude toward the right to carry, a more
stringent and limited conception of this right had emerged by the era
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Outside of the South, the limited right to carry pioneered by
Massachusetts was emulated by a number of states. A similar legal
standard emerged in Maine, Delaware, The District of Columbia,
Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Oregon, and Minnesota.141 Rather than
demonstrate a consensus on a right to open carry, the historical
record demonstrates that outside of the slave South, a radically
different and far more limited conception of the right to travel armed
emerged. Indeed, by the era of the Fourteenth Amendment, this
more limited model had also gained legislative approval and judicial
support in parts of the South.142 To assert this right, one had to be
able to demonstrate clear evidence of a reasonable fear of imminent

140. Id. at 457.
141. See 19 DEL. LAWS 733 (1852); D.C. Code § 16 (1857) (“If any person shall go
armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon,
without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or violence to his person . .
. .”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12 § 16 (1840) (“Any person, going armed with any dirk,
dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without a reasonable
cause to fear an assault on himself . . . .”); WIS. STAT. § 16 (1857) (“If any person shall
go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol or pistols, or other offensive and
dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or
violence to his person . . . .”); JOHN PURDON, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF
PENNSYLVANIA, FROM THE YEAR ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TO THE
TWENTY-FIRST DAY OF MAY, ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND SIXTY-ONE 250
(9th ed., 1862) (“If any person, not being an officer on duty in the military or naval
service of the state or of the United States, shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword
or pistol, or other offensive or dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear
an assault or other injury or violence . . . .”); THE STATUTES OF OREGON, ENACTED,
AND CONTINUED IN FORCE, BY THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 243 (1855); GEORGE B.
YOUNG, THE GENERAL STATUTES OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, AS AMENDED BY
SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION, WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED ALL GENERAL LAWS
OF THE STATE IN FORCE AT THE CLOSE OF THE LEGISLATIVE SESSION OF 1878 629 (St.
Paul, 1879) (“Whoever goes armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol or pistols, or
other offensive and dangerous weapons, without reasonable cause to fear an assault
or other injury or violence to his person . . . .”). For a discussion of these laws in the
context of the Statute of Northampton, see Charles, supra note 98.
142. See, e.g., Duke, 42 Tex. 455.
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danger before one might legally arm oneself.143 The notion of a strong
tradition of a right to carry outside of the home rests on a set of
historical myths and a highly selective reading of the evidence. The
only persuasive evidence for a strong tradition of permissive open
carry is limited to the slave South.
There is little consensus among judges and scholars about how to
interpret the Constitution. Even among those who profess to be
supporters of originalism, there is considerable disagreement over
originalist methodology. In Heller, the Supreme Court seemed to
gesture toward the new originalism and its focus on public meaning.
In McDonald, however, the same five-person majority embraced
aspects of traditional originalism and its emphasis on discerning the
intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.144 The scholarly
debate over the merits and flaws in originalist methodology is
voluminous. Even accepting the Court’s inconsistent and, at times,
incoherent originalist methodology, there is simply no compelling
historical evidence of a broad legal consensus on a right to carry nonmilitia weapons outside of the home. Indeed, there is considerable
evidence suggesting that a legal consensus had emerged outside of the
South that no such right existed. The available evidence strongly
suggests that laws restricting the use of firearms outside of the home
were the legal norm.145

143. These statutes clearly use common law approaches to remedy the evil the
legislature perceived. These laws banned a dangerous practice, but acknowledged an
exception by allowing individuals to arm themselves in cases where there was a
reasonable fear of imminent danger. The enforcement mechanism also relies on a
common law model: surety of peace. In an age before modern police forces, when
most American lived in smaller rural communities, and there was no modern
regulatory or administrative state, adopting this common law approach would have
seemed quite natural to legislatures, constables, and judges. This fact was reflected in
guidebooks written for justices of the peace and constables. See, e.g., HAMMOND,
supra note 134; see also NOVAK, supra note 96, at 235-48 (generally discussing the
common law’s conception of regulation and enforcement); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880 (1989)
(demonstrating that peace bonds were an essential means of criminal justice
enforcement in the era before professional police forces and the rise of the modern
administrative state).
144. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
145. On methodological and interpretive issues relevant to original intent
originalism, see INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL
INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990) and Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate:
A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989). On New Originalism, see
Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism For Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620
(1999); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398
(2002); and Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y

CORNELL_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1724

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

2/6/2013 10:46 PM

[Vol. XXXIX

This conclusion should hardly come as a shock to anyone familiar
with the history of Reconstruction. Indeed, Reconstruction-era
Republicans were strong supporters of generally applicable and
racially neutral gun regulations, including in some cases, bans on
traveling armed and bans on handguns. Gun regulation in the years
after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment became stricter, not
looser.146 The idea that American law recognized a right to carry
firearms in public is more supported by a Hollywood myth of the
“wild west” than historical reality.147 Even in Dodge City, that
epitome of the Wild West, gun carrying was prohibited.148
The eminent jurist John Forrest Dillon, analyzed the importance of
the reasonable threat exception to broad restrictions.149 In a series of
essays published in the Central Law Journal in 1874, Dillon explored
the complex legacy of American jurisprudence on the issue of the

599 (2004). Another variant of this theory, semantic originalism, focuses on linguistic
meaning, sometimes described as sentence meaning, timeless meaning, or semantic
meaning. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923 (2009). Finally, a less popular alternative
suggests using the Founders interpretive methods. See John O. McGinnis & Michael
Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 371, 374 (2007). Recent critiques of New Originalism include Mitchell N.
Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,

Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for
Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (2011); and Stephen M. Griffin,
Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185 (2008).
146. See Carole Emberton, The Limits of Incorporation: Violence, Gun Rights,
and Gun Regulation in the Reconstruction South, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 615
(2006). While gun rights advocates have attempted to portray Reconstruction-era
Republicans as radical gun rights advocates, the historical reality is far more complex.
Abolitionists were divided over the legitimacy of armed self-defense. Antebellum
abolitionism existed along a spectrum that ran from John Brown’s insurrectionary
theory to Quaker pacifism. Reconstruction-era Republicans were also heirs to the
antebellum Whig ideal of the well-regulated state. See also Cornell & Florence, supra
note 116, at 1060 (discussing evidence of Reconstruction-era support for racially
neutral gun regulations intended to promote public safety).
147. See Winkler, supra note 2, at 165.
148. Slotkin, supra note 112. On restrictions in the “wild west,” see Dodge City,
Kan., Ordinance No. 16, § XI (Sept. 22, 1876) and 1876 Wyo. Comp. Laws 52, § 1
(prohibiting anyone from “bear[ing] upon his person, concealed or openly, any fire
arm or other deadly weapon, within the limits of any city, town or village.”).
149. Volokh, supra note 99. Judge Niemeyer and Judge Legg in the Fourth Circuit
may have erred in putting too much faith in Volokh’s version of the past. See United
States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011) (Niemeyer, J., concurring);
Woollard v. Sheridan, No. L-10-2068, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28498, at *16–17 (D.
Md. Mar. 2, 2012).
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right to bear arms, the right of self-defense, and the right to carry.150
Dillon’s views were similar to those of another celebrated legal
theorist of this era, Joel Prentiss Bishop.151 Both men acknowledged
that the law had to balance the legitimate rights of individual selfdefense against the needs of public safety.152 Dillon’s discussion of
this issue was especially thoughtful. Drawing on a recent case,
Andrews v. State, he concluded, “every good citizen is bound to yield
his preference as to the means [of self-defense] to be used, to the
demands of the public good.”153 The state’s compelling interest in
promoting public safety did not alter the fact that there “are
circumstances under which to disarm a citizen would be to leave his
life at the mercy of treacherous and plotting enemy.”154 Dillon’s
solution to this dilemma was not permissive open carry. He turned to
a common law rule that had been absorbed into the Massachusetts
statute prohibiting traveling armed.155 If one armed oneself contrary
to a legal prohibition and a genuine threat existed, and “[i]f such a
state of facts were clearly proven,” he opined, it would “clearly be
said to fall within that class of cases in which the previously existing
common law interpolates exceptions upon subsequently enacted
statutes.”156 Dillon concluded that as far as the right to carry went,
states might regulate this practice and prohibit it entirely as long as
the common law self-defense exception was recognized. Dillion’s
summary of the state of the law in the era of the Fourteenth
Amendment is hard to reconcile with the views of pro-gun scholars
such as Volokh and O’Shea. “Every state,” Dillion wrote, “has power
to regulate the bearing of arms in such manner as it may see fit, or to
restrain it altogether.”157

150. John Forrest Dillon, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Public and Private
Defense, 1 CENT. L.J. 259 (1874).
151. See generally JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW
(7th ed. 1882).
152. See id.; see also Dillon, supra note 149.
153. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 188 (1871).
154. Dillon, supra note 149, at 286.
155. See id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 16.17 (1855).
156. See Dillon, supra note 149, at 286.
157. See Dillon, supra note 149, at 296; see also BISHOP, supra note 150.
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CONCLUSION: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE RIGHT TO CARRY
ARMS OUTSIDE THE H OME
In attempting to fashion a workable firearms jurisprudence in the
post-Heller era, judges are likely to continue to consult history, and
therefore face all of the problems that have been identified by
Heller’s critics on the left and right.158 The claim that there was a
broad consensus in Antebellum law on a right to carry openly
mistakenly equates a distinctively Southern tradition of permissive
carry with the existence of a larger constitutional consensus on this
question.159 The dominant legal tradition in America was not open
carry, but quite the opposite. A broad range of restrictions on the use
of arms in public, including bans on the right to carry in public,
emerged in the decades after the adoption of the Second
Amendment. Rather than look to the slave South as the foundation
for crafting “an analytical framework” for the post-Heller era, judges
would do better to look to the North and the Massachusetts model.
Robust regulation, including bans on traveling armed, are clearly
constitutional and consistent with Heller’s recognition of long
standing historical traditions of arms regulation in America.160

158. For a discussion of the problems with courts ignoring professional historians
in favor of advocacy scholarship, see Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment
Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 272-73 (2008) and Richard
A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 38–40.
159. See Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
160. See Woollard v. Sheridan, No. L-10-2068, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28498 (D. Md.
Mar. 2, 2012) (targeting a law derivative of the Massachusetts model); see also MD.
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(5)(ii) (West 2011) (“[T]he Secretary shall issue
a permit within a reasonable time to a person who the Secretary finds . . . has good
and substantial reason to wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such as a finding that
the permit is necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.”).

